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Abstract
While empirical studies which analyze large cross section country data find that cor-
ruption lowers investment and thereby economic growth, this result cannot be established
for certain subsamples of countries. We argue that one reason for these mixed findings
may be that a country’s corruption and growth rates are tightly linked as variables of a
dynamic process which can have several equilibria or have different sets of equilibria. In
order to understand the circumstances in which a country converges towards a certain
equilibrium, we model the individual decisions to invest and corrupt as an evolutionary
game. In this model the quality of government institutions is an endogenous variable,
depending on the corruption rate, the population income, and the type of institutions;
the quality of institutions itself then determines the future incentives to corrupt. The
comprehension of these feedback effects allows us to study the role of the type of insti-
tutions for the dynamics of corruption. We present the equilibria for different types of
institutions and discuss the resulting dynamics. The results suggest that cross country
studies may significantly underestimate the impact of corruption on growth for certain
countries. Depending on how the quality of institutions depends on corruption and in-
come, corruption can either lower growth, suppress it entirely, or be positively correlated
with growth in some special situations.
Keywords: Corruption, Institutions, Feedback Effects, Evolutionary Game.
JEL-Classification: C73, D73
∗Address: UCLA, Department of Economics, 8283 Bunche Hall, Box 951477, Los Angeles, CA
90095-1477. Email: bruegger@ucla.edu
1
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1 Introduction
Due to the lack of time series data with sufficiently many year points that measure the
prevalence of corruption in a society,1 cross section data analysis has been the main
method in economic research for studying the causes and consequences of corruption.
Among the most important findings of this literature is the observation that corrup-
tion lowers economic growth (Mauro, 1995).2 The reasons are reduced investment
incentives3 and lowered institutional quality, which both influence economic growth
negatively.4
However, these results are not robust for certain groups of countries: Rock and
Bonnett (2004) find that ”corruption tends to increase growth in the large East Asian
newly industrialized economies”. Similarly, for a selection of Southeast Asian nations,
Lim and Stern (2002) point out that ”relatively high levels of corruption have been
associated with decades of very rapid GDP growth” (p. 46). These controversial
findings do not come as a surprise: First, the impact of corruption on growth has not
been very pronounced in many studies (see e.g. Li et al., 2000), and second, there is
abundant anecdotic evidence that nations going through a successful developing process
experience a surge in corruption during their economic take-off (Wedeman, 2004).5
How can we reconcile these mixed results? One possible explanation is that a
country’s corruption and growth rates are endogenous variables of a dynamic process
1The indicator for the prevalence of corruption most widely used in empirical research is the Corrup-
tion Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International (TI), an international non-governmental
organization devoted to combating corruption. The first year the CPI was published is 1995.
2Other conclusions from cross-country studies include: Corruption increases poverty and income
inequality (Gupta et al., 2002; Hindriks et al., 1999; Johnston, 1989), it augments the public deficit
and public debt, increases mismanagement of public services and the respective transaction costs (Tanzi,
2002; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000), it reduces the effectiveness of social spending, the formation of human
capital (Gupta et al., 2002), expenditure on education and health (Tanzi, 2002) and tax revenue (Tanzi
and Davoodi, 2000).
3In a corrupt environment private investment, both domestic and foreign, yields lower returns be-
cause of additional costs and a climate of heightened uncertainty (Mauro, 1995). This result has been
supported by the work of Brunetti et al. (1998), Chong and Calderon (2000), Mauro (1995), Mauro
(1997), Mauro (1998), Knack and Keefer (1995), Wei (2000), Tanzi and Davoodi (2000) and others.
Furthermore, Ades and Di Tella (1997) present a formal model.
4North (1990), Murphy et al. (1993), Murphy et al. (1991) and Husted (1999) present models of
how institutions affect growth, and for empirical evidence see Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), Dollar and
Kraay (2003), Kaufmann et al. (2000), Buscaglia (2001), Keefer and Knack (1997); among others.
5See Hofstaedter (1973) for the example of the United States.
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with several equilibria such that variables of different countries can converge to distinct
equilibria. The impact of corruption on growth may be different on two paths not
converging to the same equilibrium.
In the following we explain why we think that a dynamic consideration is essential
for understanding the consequences of corruption. Based on this, we then present a
model that captures the dynamic aspects of corruption. We use the results to criticize
the cross-country approach and to make suggestions for future empirical work.
Why is a dynamic setup appropriate to study corruption? Because only a dynamic
setup allows for the comprehension of feedback effects between the individual decisions
to corrupt and population variables like growth or corruption rate. It is clear that the
individual decisions determine the corruption and the growth rate: The more individu-
als decide to engage in corrupt activities, the higher is the corruption rate (Chakrabarti,
2001), and the less individuals decide to invest in production, the lower is the growth
rate. However, the corruption and the growth rate themselves have an impact on the
individual incentives to corrupt. In both cases, the quality of government institutions
can be suggested as a link. Institutions that are weakened by corruption are likely to
impose lower costs on corrupt behavior than strong institutions. From this we expect
the corruption rate to have a positive impact on the individual incentive to corrupt.6
Similarly, we expect the growth rate to affect the individual decisions to corrupt. The
value of property rights increases in presence of growth. Since people are willing to
spend more to protect property rights the more they are worth (Eggertsson, 1990),
growth increases the quality of institutions.7 So we expect growth to reduce the incen-
tives to corrupt. Note that a comprehension of the feedback effects described requires
the quality of institutions to be an endogenous variable depending on the population
variables.
There is a variety of dynamic frameworks that could be employed. We choose the
one of an evolutionary game. In our view, this approach has three advantages. First,
feedback effects as described above can be included by extending the framework to a
frequency dependent evolutionary game (Bruegger, 2005). Second, a large number of
agents choose between different behavioral strategies, which explicitly represents the
6This reasoning is not new, Paldam (2002) and Rose-Ackerman (1999) have argued that a high
corruption rate may be self-sustainable. Andvig and Moene (1990) come to the same conclusion using
a slightly different argument.
7Chong and Calderon (2000) find empirical evidence that institutional quality itself is a consequence
of economic growth.
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individual decisions. Third, the setup of an evolutionary game naturally captures the
situation of scarce information that prevails for illegal activities such as corruption. We
assume an imitation rule as a strategy selection rule since imitation is a plausible way of
mastering a situation of scarce information. In comparison, a general equilibrium model
of corruption would also generate several equilibria, but not identify off-equilibrium
behavior and path dependence of current population states. A growth model with a
representative agent would capture the dynamic aspect of corruption, but not allow for
the explicit specification of the individual incentives.
Let us briefly describe our model. The underlying game of the evolutionary game
we consider consists of three strategies: agents choose between a private sector activity,
being a fair government employee, and being a corrupt government employee. The pri-
vate sector activity is an innovative activity, i.e. the investing strategy. It’s return is a
fixed surplus when playing against a fair government employee or another private entre-
preneur. In case the private entrepreneur plays against a corrupt government employee,
the corrupt government employee siphons the surplus and the private entrepreneur is
left without return. A fair government employee earns the government wage no matter
whom he plays against. The corrupt government employee also earns the government
wage if playing against another government employee. However, if he plays against a
private entrepreneur, he extorts the surplus from private sector activity but bears the
costs of the corrupt act - that is, the probability of getting caught red-handed and
losing all his income in this case. These payoffs imply that the more corruption there
is (the higher the frequency of corrupt government employees), the lower the incentive
for private investment.
How do population variables affect the individual decisions? As mentioned above,
the quality of institutions must depend on population variables like the corruption or
the growth rate. One way to establish this is to define institutional quality as the
detection probability of corruption. Note that a high detection probability results in
high costs of corruption. The costs of corruption enter the corrupt strategy’s payoff
and are therefore relevant for the decision to imitate it. The first type of institutions
we study is characterized by a general functional form of the detection probability: We
only assume that the detection probability depends negatively on the corruption rate.
The second type of institutions we consider is an example for a more specific case: We
assume that the detection probability depends positively on the population income.
This is suggested by the feedback effect between growth and institutional quality.
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For the general specification, the corruption dynamics features several evolutionary
equilibria: A clean equilibrium, a corrupt equilibrium, and a hybrid equilibrium. De-
pending on the initial strategy state and other exogenous variables, a population will
converge to one of these equilibrium. A clean equilibrium where corruption is extin-
guished can only exist if detection probability is high in absence of corruption. As a
consequence, populations with notoriously inefficient government institutions are not
expected to free themselves from corruption. However, if the quality of institutions
increases with more private activity, a population can converge to a clean equilibrium.
In a corrupt equilibrium private activity is driven out of the game and only corrupt
activity prevails. Such an equilibrium always exists if the detection probability is low
in presence of a high corruption rate. We conclude that if corruption in the govern-
ment affects the institution’s efficiency negatively, the possibility of a population being
trapped in a corrupt equilibrium will prevail. A hybrid equilibrium exists for a detection
probability that is not too high, but also only lightly affected by corruption. In such
an equilibrium, the entire government is corrupt but private activity is not suppressed.
As countries may feature institutions which qualities may change in different man-
ners for a given corruption rate or may start off with different corruption rates, there
is no reason to assume that they converge to the same equilibrium. Therefore, cross
country studies may actually blur the consequences of corruption. If countries con-
verging to different equilibria are pooled in one sample, the consequences of corruption
might be underestimated for countries converging towards the corrupt equilibrium (and
overestimated for those converging towards the clean equilibrium). The reason is that
a negative impact of corruption on growth is measured while corruption actually not
only lowers growth but prevents an increase. Only with a deeper understanding of how
institutional quality depends on growth and corruption will increase the explanatory
power of empirical analysis.
2 The Basic Model
In this section we present the model of corruption as an evolutionary game but without
endogenous quality of institutions yet. We refer to this version of the model as the basic
corruption game. We present its stage game and discuss our choice of an imitation rule
which generally leads to replicator dynamics. In addition, we introduce the notion of
an evolutionary equilibrium as an equilibrium concept.
An evolutionary game describes strategic interaction over time. It is defined by the
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populations of players, a state space of strategies, a stage game, and an adaptation rule
which determines the dynamic adjustment process.
2.1 The Population
We model corruption in a one-population game. We assume the population to consist
of a continuum of infinitely-lived players. This assumption has several well-discussed
implications (see Friedman, 1998, for a complete list). First, the state space of strategies
is continuous. In adherence to continuous time this allows us to specify the dynamics
of a game as a system of ordinary differential equations. Second, for an infinite number
of players the law of large numbers can be invoked. This allows us to ignore random
fluctuations and differing perceptions of the current state among players. Third, an
infinite number of players motivates the myopia assumption inherent to our dynamic
adjustment process specified below. Players’ influence on population are so small that
players do not attempt to influence other players’ future actions.
2.2 The Strategies
In order to model corruption, we need three strategies: strategy 1, strategy 2, and
strategy 3. Hence, the pure-strategy set of any player is S = {1, 2, 3}. To simplify
interpretations, we presume that individuals only play pure strategies. It is convenient
for upcoming calculations to introduce the following notation. If an individual plays
strategy i, i ∈ S, we denote his strategy choice σi as a vector in IR3:
σi ∈
{
σ1 =
(
1
0
0
)
, σ2 =
(
0
1
0
)
, σ3 =
(
0
0
1
)}
.
The fraction of the population playing strategy i at time t is denoted by xi(t) ∈
[0, 1]. The fractions of the population playing the three strategies (also called strategy
frequencies) are the variables in our model which changes we intend to describe over
time. The strategy state of the game,
x(t) =
(
x1(t)
x2(t)
x3(t)
)
,
specifies the frequency of each of the three strategies in t. We will drop the time index
t if there is no risk of misunderstanding.
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The set of feasible strategy states is called the strategy state space. Since strategy
frequencies must add up to one, the strategy state space for an evolutionary game is a
simplex. We define the simplex of dimension n− 1 as
Σn−1 =
{
x(t) ∈ IRn
∣∣∣∣ xi(t) ≥ 0 and
n∑
i=1
xi(t) = 1 for i = 1, ..., n
}
.
The strategy state space of our game is Σ2, since we can omit one dimension. We
redefine the strategy state as x = (x1, x2), from which we can always calculate x3 =
1− x1 − x2.
Let us now turn to the interpretations of the three strategies. Strategy 1 represents
the choice of holding down a job as government employee while not exploiting the power
of the position. That is, a player choosing Strategy 1 acts as a fair government employee.
Strategy 2 also comprises to serve in public service, but in contrast to Strategy 1, the
player now abuses the power of the public role for private benefits. Strategy 2 can
therefore be referred to as the strategy of a corrupt government employee. The third
option is to pursue a productive private sector activity. We refer to Strategy 3 as
the strategy of a private entrepreneur. Sometimes it is convenient to speak of public
servants or government employees generally; in this case we refer to the total of players
with Strategy 1 and 2. The share of public servants is abbreviated with xG = x1 + x2.
In every period, players are matched pairwise to play the stage game. In our
application, such a pairwise encounter of two players is interpreted as one economic
interaction. This means that each play of the stage game is considered as one economic
act. The strategy choice of a player represents his decision which sector to direct his
manpower to. The greater the share of individuals working in the public sector, xG,
the greater the share of economic activity that is processed entirely within the public
sector (games played among government employees) or with the help of the public
sector (games between private entrepreneurs and public servants).8
Note that our choice of a one-population model has three implications for the in-
terpretation of the basic corruption game. First, the size of government, measured
as the share of agents employing strategy 1 or 2, is endogenous. That means, agents
find ways and means to work for the government as long as it pays for them. Second,
government employees play against themselves. These interactions can be interpreted
8The share of economic activity taking place within the government (administration) is Pr(xG ≥
y)2 = x2G and the share of economic activity happening within the private sector is Pr(y ≥ xG)2 =
(1− xG)2 = x3 2.
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as organizational and administrative tasks within a government which we believe to be
a realistic feature in a model including the public sector.9 Third, the private sector
cannot elude the interaction with the public sector, no matter whether it is beneficial or
damaging to its business.10 In the next subsection we describe how the three strategies
are presumed to interact.
2.3 The Stage Game
The stage game characterizes the strategic interaction of two players at any point in
time. The stage game of the basic corruption game is a normal form game defined by
payoff matrix A. In every period players are drawn randomly and pairwise to play the
stage game and receive the average payoff f(σi, x) = σTi Ax.
11
The assumptions for A are as follows. A fair government employee receives the wage
w at any point in time, independently of his opponent. The interpretation is that he is
paid w no matter whether he is busy mainly delivering services to the private sector or
doing work within the administration. The corrupt government employee, too, receives
the wage w at any point in time, but additionally seizes a corruption income when
playing against a private entrepreneur. The private entrepreneur generates a surplus
s when being paired with another private entrepreneur or a fair government employee,
and loses the fruits of his work when encountering a corrupt government employee.
The corruption income of the corrupt public servant can be specified as s− c, where c
depicts the individual costs of corruption. These assumptions lead to
A =


w w w
w w w + s− c
s 0 s

 . (1)
It is a simplifying assumption that the payoff of a private entrepreneur does not vary
9The rate at which the economic activities taking place within the administration increase with a
marginal change of xG is inherent in the game structure:
∂ Pr(xG≥x)2
∂xG
= 2xG.
10Note that this feature is similar to a type of world Niskanen proposes: sponsors (in our case these
are the private entrepreneurs as we will see in the next subsection) are passive in accepting the output
proposal of bureaucracy without any careful monitoring or evaluation of alternatives (Niskanen, 1996).
11As common in the literature, we do not differentiate between the average (expected) payoff against
the population and the realized payoff of a specific stage game played. There are several reasons for that
(Friedman, 1998): First, in large populations such as ours the expected payoff is a sufficient statistic.
Second, payoffs are often not generated by random pairwise encounters, but by general interactions
such as markets, and are therefore not stochastic.
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between playing against a fair public servant and playing against a private entrepre-
neur. From our view this simplification is justified by the following interpretation: an
entrepreneur makes the surplus s from his business activity while losing it with proba-
bility x2, because he cannot circumvent interaction with the government.12 Changing
the payoff for Strategy 3 when playing against Strategy 1 (this is element a31 of matrix
A), amounts to making a statement about the efficiency of public service. The reason
is that x1 would then affect the average payoff of Strategy 3. If a31 = s though, then it
is only x2 that influences the private entrepreneur’s average payoff. Although we have
an idea in which direction we could change a31, we do not want to include such an
effect in our model. It is our aim to analyze the impact of corruption and we do not
want to blur the results with other effects.
Note that the game can easily be scaled such that all agents engage in a production
alternative beside the three strategy games which is not subject to corruption and does
not enhance growth.13 Even if this production output is subject to taxes, it does not
change the equilibria of our model, wherefore we normalize its payoff to zero.
2.4 The Imitation Rule and the Adjustment Dynamics
Now let us describe in the following how the players select their strategies.
Our analysis is based upon the hypothesis, that strategy selection by imitation is
a realistic assumption when describing illegal behavior. Players imitate the strategy of
other, more successful players, where success refers to greater expected payoff. They
base their decision which strategy to imitate on sporadically and imperfectly observed
expected payoffs and behavior. Information is scarce because knowledgeable players
hide the information for which they can be prosecuted. To derive adjustment dynamics
we follow Weibull (1995, p. 155). Note that time is continuous in our model.
Assume that all agents review their strategy choice at any point in time. Let us
denote the probability with which an agent playing strategy i (called i-players in the
following) switches to strategy j, by ϕji (x). The share of i-players that will imitate
another strategy is
∑
j ∈S\i
xiϕ
j
i (x) = xi − xiϕii(x) .
12Imagine that the entrepreneur needs to collect permits or certificates from the administration, has
to pay taxes to the government, or is subjected to controls by law.
13Such a production alternative corresponds to the ”production of subsistence crop” in Murphy et al.
(1993).
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The share of players imitating i that have played a different strategy before is
∑
j ∈S\i
xjϕ
i
j(x) =
∑
j ∈S
xjϕ
i
j(x)− xiϕii(x) .
This leads to a net effect in the share of i-players of
ẋi =
∑
j ∈S
xjϕ
i
j(x)− xi . (2)
We now further specify this general adjustment dynamics by making assumptions
on ϕij(x): At time t, every player samples an opponent with a probability equal for
all opponents. Every player knows his own average payoff f(σj , x) which depends on
his strategy σj , he observes the opponent’s strategy and, with some noise, the oppo-
nent’s average payoff. Therewith, a j-player sampling an i-player observes f(σi, x)− ε
with probability xi, where ε is a random variable with a continuously differentiable
cumulative distribution function Φ : IR → [0, 1].
We assume the following imitation rule: A j-player imitates strategy i when his
own average payoff (known without noise) is smaller than the observed average payoff
of strategy i. That is, he imitates strategy i if f(σj , x) < f(σi, x)− ε. The probability
that a j-player imitates i is Pr[ε < f(σi, x) − f(σj , x)] = Φ[f(σi − σj , x)]. So the
adjustment dynamics takes the form
ẋi = xi
∑
j ∈S
xj
(
Φ[f(σi − σj , x)]− Φ[f(σj − σi, x)]
)
.
Finally we must specify the cumulative distribution function Φ. We assume a uniformly
distributed error term ε over the interval of possible expected payoff differences. So the
function Φ is linear, Φ(y) = α + βy, and the adjustment dynamics derived from the
imitation rule simplifies to
ẋi = 2βxi (f(σi, x)− f(x, x)) .
Except from a time rescaling, our dynamics is thus equal to the replicator dynamics
(see Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Schuster and Sigmund, 1983),
ẋi = xi (f(σi, x)− f(x, x)) ∀i ∈ S . (3)
Since we do not focus on rates of convergence in this paper, we can continue using
equation (3). We alternatively will refer to it as the replicator dynamics or the imita-
tion dynamics. Note that in our model, by equation (3), strategy selection from myopic
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imitation leads to a deterministic, continuous-time, continuous-state dynamics. Fur-
thermore, note that equation (3) is a system of ordinary differential equations. For a
simplified notation, we define the system’s right hand side as the (Lipschitz continuous)
function F : Σ → Σ, and can now write the imitation dynamics as ẋ = F (x).14
2.5 The Equilibrium Concept
Since we abandon the assumption of a constant stage game in Section 3 for the analysis
with endogenous quality of institution, a dynamic equilibrium concept needs to be
employed. Therefore we choose the evolutionary equilibrium EE15 which, unlike the
widely used concept Evolutionary Stable Strategy that refers to a constant stage game
(Friedman, 1998), assures stability of F in an equilibrium.
Definition 1 A strategy state x ∈ Σn−1 is an evolutionary equilibrium of an evolution-
ary game if x is an attractor16 of the dynamical system ẋ = F (x) defining the game’s
adjustment dynamics.
What is the interpretation of our equilibrium concept’s definition for evolutionary
games? By solving equation (3), we can describe which strategies will be imitated
more or less frequently for every strategy state in the state space. Thus, we can calcu-
late which strategy frequencies a population exhibits over time after having been in a
certain strategy state. Such a ”solution path” for a given initial strategy state is called
a solution trajectory. An evolutionary equilibrium is a subset of state space Σn−1 which
a solution trajectory does not leave once reached. Additionally, if a solution trajectory
of the dynamics starts sufficiently close to the evolutionary equilibrium, it remains close
and converges asymptotically to the evolutionary equilibrium over time. The open set
of points in Σn−1 converging to a given EE are called its basin of attraction.
14The replicator dynamics are simplex invariant:
X
i∈S
ẋi =
X
i∈S
xi (f(σi, x)− f(x, x)) =
X
i∈S
xif(σi, x)− f(x, x)
X
i∈S
xi
= f(x, x)− f(x, x) = 0 .
15The term evolutionary equilibrium was introduced by Hirshleifer (1982).
16An attractor is defined as an asymptotically stable non-wandering set (in our case the only possible
non-wandering sets are critical points and points on limit cycles or graphics). For definitions of critical
points (also called equilibrium points or fixed points), limit cycles, graphics (also called separatrix
cycles), asymptotic stability, and non-wandering sets see Perko (2000) or any textbook on dynamic
systems.
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3 Endogenous Quality of Institutions
In Section 3.1 we include the feedback between corruption and the individual incentive
to corrupt by modelling quality of institutions as an endogenous variable. In Section
3.2 we present our main result and discuss them in Section 3.3. Finally, we discuss the
corruption dynamics when the feedback effect between growth and institutional quality
is included in the corruption game.
3.1 The Strategy State Dependent Payoff Matrix
We change the stage game in two ways: First, we model the government wage as an
endogenous variable of tax revenue. Second, we define the costs of corruption as a
function of the strategy state. In order to do so, we write each component of the payoff
matrix (1) as a function of the strategy state x. It is obvious that these extensions
depart from standard evolutionary game theory. We now actually analyze a frequency
dependent evolutionary game (Bruegger, 2005).
Let us assume that government wage is a function of tax revenue (and population
income therefore), and that the government budget is financed through proportional
taxes. Furthermore, we assume that the government’s budget is balanced at any point
in time and that all legally earned payoffs are subject to taxes. The tax rate is denoted
by τ .
According to that, net income equals (1−τ)w(x) for the government employees and
(1− τ)s(x) for the private entrepreneurs. The costs of corruption are specified below.
Hence, we rewrite the payoff matrix of the corruption game as
A(x) =


(1− τ)w(x) (1− τ)w(x) (1− τ)w(x)
(1− τ)w(x) (1− τ)w(x) (1− τ)w(x) + s(x)− c(x)
(1− τ)s(x) 0 (1− τ)s(x)

 . (4)
The function c(x) depicts the expected costs of corrupting a private entrepreneur and
absorbing his surplus s(x) from private economic activity. The probability at which
a corrupt activity is detected is denoted by p(x), p(x) ⊆ [0, 1]. If corrupt actions are
detected with a high (low) probability we say that institutional quality is high (low).
We assume that if a corrupt government employee is caught red-handed, he is punished
by having drawn off his net income, i.e.
c(x) = p(x) ((1− τ)w(x) + s(x)) .
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Note that a corrupt government employee encountering a private entrepreneur obtains
the payoff w(x) + s(x) if p(x) = 0 and obtains a zero payoff if p(x) = 1. We leave de-
tection probability p(x) unspecified for the moment and describe the corruption game’s
dynamics for a general function p(x). Later we will discuss the game with a specification
of the function p(x). For now we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 An increase in the share of corrupt government employees decreases
the probability that a corrupt act is detected, i.e.,
∂p
∂x2
(x) < 0 .
Further an increase in the share of corrupt government employees decreases the detec-
tion probability by more than an increase in the share of fair government employees,
i.e.,
∂p
∂x2
(x) <
∂p
∂x1
(x) .
Note that ∂p∂x1 (x) can be positive or negative. Assumption 1 includes the feedback
between institutional quality and corruption in our model.
Though it is possible to analyze the game with w(x), s(x), and c(x) being functions
of x, we choose to normalize s(x) = 1. By that normalization we abandon the possi-
bility of a frequency dependent surplus from private activity. Though we are aware of
interesting specifications of s(x), we abstain from including such an effect. The reason
is that we model the costs of corruption for the private sector in the payoff matrix
directly, and do not want to lessen the explanatory power of the model by including
further effects. Note that by setting s(x) = 1, government activities are of no direct
utility for the private sector. But of course we can choose a p(x) such that the share
of fair government employees influences the costs of corruption.
These assumptions allow us to calculate the government wage explicitly. Tax rev-
enue r(x) is given by
r(x) = τxT


w(x) w(x) w(x)
w(x) w(x) w(x)
1 0 1

x
= τ ((x1 + x2)w(x) + (1− x1 − x2)(1− x2)) .
As mentioned above, the government is not able to tax the transfers from the private
entrepreneur to the corrupt government employee. Thus, only legal payoffs are enlisted
3 ENDOGENOUS QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS 14
in the matrix used for tax revenue calculation. Now we can explicitly compute w(x)
using the budget constraint of the government:
w(x) =
r(x)
x1 + x2
,
=
τ ((x1 + x2)w(x) + (1− x1 − x2)(1− x2))
x1 + x2
.
By solving for government salary we receive
w(x) =
τ
1− τ
(1− x1 − x2)(1− x2)
x1 + x2
.
Plugging the explicit expression for w(x) into the definition of r(x) yields
r(x) =
τ
1− τ (1− x1 − x2)(1− x2) .
This allows us to evaluate how the government wage and the tax revenue depend on
x1 and x2.
∂w(x)
∂x2
<
∂w(x)
∂x1
< 0 and
∂r(x)
∂x2
<
∂r(x)
∂x1
< 0 .
It is not surprising that the derivations of the government wage with respect to x1
and x2 are negative. Firstly, if either x1 or x2 increases, the frequency of private
entrepreneurs decreases. However, this fraction of the population is solely responsible
for the contribution of value to r(x), since government employees only pay tax on their
wages which are a fraction of r(x); hence the government employees cannot contribute
to tax revenue positively. Secondly, the higher the number of government employees
is, the lower is government salary for a given r(x). The reason is our assumption
of a balanced government budget: if x1 or x2 increases, r(x) has to be split among
more employees, so each gets a smaller wage. We also observe that the derivation
of government wage with respect to x2 is smaller than the one with respect to x1.
The rationale for this is the following. The more corrupt government employees there
are, the higher is the share of games played among corrupt employees and private
entrepreneurs. This implies that more of the entrepreneurs’ surpluses flow outside the
taxation system because they become illegal income from corruption. This reduces r(x)
and therewith w(x).
3.2 The Main Result - The Dynamics of Corruption
In the last subsection we specified the functions in the payoff matrix of the corruption
game, except for p(x) which we want to treat generally. We can rewrite the payoff
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matrix (4) as
A(x) =


0 0 0
0 0 1− c(x)
(1− τ)(1− w(x)) −(1− τ)w(x) (1− τ)(1− w(x))

 (5)
without changing its dynamics (Bruegger, 2005). The replicator dynamics for frequency
dependent evolutionary game yields a system of three differential equations for the
corruption game. We drop the third equation for ẋ3 and substitute x3 by 1− x1 − x2.
This leaves us with the planar system
ẋ1 = x1(1− x1 − x2) [(1− τ)(w(x)− 1)− x2(τ − c(x))]
ẋ2 = x2(1− x1 − x2) [(1− τ)w(x) + (1− x2)(τ − c(x))] .
(6)
We describe the dynamics of corruption in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, the corruption game can only have the following
three critical points as evolutionary equilibria (EE):
• (x1, x2) = (τ, 0) is an EE if 12−τ < p(τ, 0),
• (x1, x2) = (0, 1) is an EE if p(0, 1) < τ ,
• (x1, x2) = (0, x̄2) exists as a critical point if there exists an x̄2 satisfying p(0, x̄2) =
τ
(1−x̄2)2τ+x̄2 and is an EE if −
∂c
∂x2
(0, x̄2) < τx̄22
.
There always exists at least one evolutionary equilibrium.
According to Proposition 1, the corruption game can have seven different combinations
of evolutionary equilibria. We show these in Figure 1: The bottom left vertex of
the simplex represents the strategy state (1, 0) (only fair government employees), the
bottom right vertex the strategy state (0, 1) (only corrupt government employees), and
the top vertex the strategy state (0, 0) (only private entrepreneurs).
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix A on the pages 26-39.
3.3 Interpreting the Main Result
Our first observation is, that the dynamics of corruption converge. We find three
strategy states that can be evolutionary equilibria under our assumptions. We discuss
them in turn.
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Figure 1: The possible combinations of evolutionary equilibria.
3.3.1 The Clean Equilibrium
The critical point (τ, 0) always exists and is an evolutionary equilibrium if the detec-
tion probability of corrupt behavior is sufficiently high in (τ, 0). We refer to this EE
as the clean equilibrium because all corrupt activity is crowded out by private activity
and fair government service. The higher the tax rate, the higher the share of govern-
ment employees in this equilibrium. The reason for this result is the way we defined
government wage: Since we distribute all tax revenue equally among the government
employees, their share will rise until the government salary equals the net return from
private activity.
We know that a clean equilibrium exists, if the function p(x), the society’s detection
probability, takes a high values for x2 → 0. We conclude that for a society with a
judiciary functioning efficiently at a low corruption rate, a clean equilibrium exists.
This is a slightly optimistic finding: As long as institutions detect corruption well for
low corruption rates, at least some initial strategy states converge towards the clean
equilibrium.
Note that a population may have a clean equilibrium for some tax rates, but not
for others. Let us briefly discuss the condition for the clean equilibrium, 12−τ < p(τ, 0).
The left hand side of the inequality is an increasing function in τ , p(τ, 0) as a function
of τ , can actually lie above, below or intersect with it. If p(τ, 0) lies above (below), the
clean equilibrium exists for all tax rates (does not exist for any tax rate). If the two
function intersect and p(τ, 0) is the steeper (flatter) function at the intersection point,
then the clean equilibrium only exists for tax rates above (below) a certain threshold.
Of course we can have several threshold and therefore intervals of tax rates in which
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the clean equilibrium exists.
3.3.2 The Corrupt Equilibrium - The Corruption Trap
The second critical point, (0, 1), also exists independently of the specification of p(x).
Furthermore, it is an evolutionary equilibrium if the function p(x) takes a value low
enough in (0, 1). In this case we speak of a corrupt equilibrium or a corruption trap
because in this equilibrium all agents choose to be corrupt government employees.
A society’s detection probability p(x) takes low values for a high corruption rate if
corruption badly affects a society’s judiciary or its implementation. As soon as elements
of a judiciary that are responsible for the detection of corruption can be corrupted, we
expect that the society can be trapped in the corruption equilibrium for at least some
initial strategy states.17
Of course the tax rate plays an important role for the existence of the corruption
trap. The higher the tax rate is, the higher can p(0, 1) be such that the corruption trap
still exists. So one way to escape from a path towards the corruption trap is to cut
taxes. We will elaborate on this possibility further below.
3.3.3 The Hybrid Equilibrium
The last critical point, (0, x̄2) does not exist for all τ and all p(x). The right hand side
of the condition for its existence is a function which can become greater than 1 for big
τ , so this equilibrium exists for small and moderate tax rates only.
If (0, x̄2) exists and if the costs of corruption are not decreasing too strongly in
x2, then it is an EE of the corruption game. We refer to it as the hybrid equilibrium
17The corrupt equilibrium may appear unlikely at first glance, because all players choose to be
government employed although government wage converges to zero. We offer two arguments in favor
of this evolutionary equilibrium. The first is an example: During Carlos Menem’s last term of office as
President of Argentina, 70% (!) of the labor force was employed by the local governments in many of
the provinces (namely Chaco, Tucumán, La Rioja, and others). The majority of government employees
barely worked yet collected their salary in the end of the month. At that time, Argentina certainly
fulfilled the condition for the existence of the corrupt equilibrium: although the corruption rate was
high, almost nobody was convicted for corrupt activities. Only 5% of Argentineans reported that they
would seek judicial help in case of severe problems. The efficiency of the judiciary was too low for people
to bother reporting corruption (and other crimes). The example is taken from TI’s Daily Corruption
News Service, http://www.transparency.org/cgi-bin/dcn-read.pl?citID=35148. The second argument
is a theoretical one. The dynamics converge at an extremely low speed towards (0, 1), so our model
does not actually suggest any observations of (0, 1) or its close vicinity.
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because the government service is entirely corrupt but does not suppress private eco-
nomic activity. If a society’s detection probability p(x) does not depend strongly on
the corruption rate and is neither very high nor very low, then we expect the hybrid
equilibrium to exist. Consequently, a society whose judiciary is not too strong but also
not too badly affected by corruption may have a hybrid equilibrium and can converge
to it at least for some initial strategy states.
3.3.4 Discussion
The stability conditions for the three critical points are independent of each other.
Therefore the specification of p(x) and the tax rate τ may imply any combination of
the three evolutionary equilibria for the corruption game. By definition the EE are
the attractors of (6), and since Proposition 1 denotes all EE, every trajectory through
an initial strategy state x0 ∈ Σ2 of system (6) converges to one of the EE.18 If two or
three EE exist for a given p(x) and τ respectively, then the initial state is decisive for
the EE the population converges to. The sets of initial strategy states that converge
to a certain evolutionary equilibrium are called the evolutionary equilibria’s basins of
attraction. We now discuss three implications of Proposition 1 for which we do not
have to calculate the basins of attraction of the EE.
First, the corruption trap has the lowest population income. Reducing the tax rate
can eliminate the corruption trap. The intuition for this is that the net payoff for
private activity is enhanced and the government wage reduced, such that the return as
a corrupt government employee is decreased. However, reducing the tax rate can also
eliminate the clean equilibrium, since the institutions could be weakened depending
on how institutional quality depends on the share of fair government employees. As a
consequence, corruption could then not be suppressed.
Second, the model does not require that the quality of the institutions must be high
at any point on a path towards the clean equilibrium. If corruption is high and therefore
the quality of institutions low, a country can still converge to the clean equilibrium for
some initial strategy states.
Third, a population with institutions which are not very efficient but also not vul-
nerable to corruption can converge to a hybrid equilibrium. Without a specific function
18Note that the separatrices are exceptions. The separatrices of a dynamical system are those tra-
jectories that approach a saddle point in the limit. The corruption game can have two saddle points at
most; these are (0, x̄2) and (τ−x̂2, x̂2) (see Proof of Proposition 1). So we have at most two separatrices
within the simplex.
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for p(x) it is not possible to say if the population income is higher in the hybrid than
the clean equilibrium.
What does Proposition 1 imply for empirical research? Cross section data may
actually contain countries that are developing along solution trajectories that converge
to distinct equilibria. If this is the case, our estimation of the impact of corruption
on growth will not be meaningful. For any selection of data points in the simplex
containing points converging to different equilibria, an estimation of the impact of
corruption on growth is far too optimistic for those countries that converge to the
corrupt equilibrium: While corruption will have no long term effect for those on the
trajectory to the clean equilibrium, those that converge to the corrupt one suffer big
losses in income from corruption. We can now understand how a group of Asian
countries can show a positive correlation between corruption and growth rate: They
either converged to the hybrid equilibrium or follow a trajectory that show increasing
share of private and corrupt activity before converging in one of the three equilibria.
We conclude that a meaningful estimation of the impact of corruption can be obtained
if the sample shows the same convergence behavior. To determine the equilibrium a
country converges to is a very challenging task and we need to gain further insights
about the role of institutions in a dynamic setting. The reason is that only with a
specific description of how the quality of institutions depends on growth and corruption
rate, we will be able to determine the basins of attractions of the different equilibria.
The description of the basins of attractions would then allow us to classify countries
according to their convergence behavior more reliably.
The type of institutions we have studied up to now is characterized by Assumption
1: The more corruption there is, the lower the probability that a corrupt activity is
detected. In the next section, we consider another type of institutions which quality
also depends on the population income. We specify the detection probability function
explicitly and show how the basins of attraction can be determined. In order to describe
each equilibrium’s basin of attraction formally, the system would have to be solved
explicitly. As it is the case for many nonlinear differential equation systems, this is not
possible. Instead, we provide an example of a function p(x) and describe the global
behavior of the corruption game by numerical simulations.
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3.4 The Feedback Effect between Income and Quality of Institutions
In our model, the legal population income is
l(x1, x2) =
(1− x1 − x2)(1− x2)
1− τ . (7)
The higher the income of a population is, the more valuable are property rights. Conse-
quently, populations are disposed to provide more resources to protect property rights
the richer they are. Let’s assume that players have the possibility to protect their
property rights, for instance by establishing a judiciary that is independent of the gov-
ernment. We then suggest that the efficiency of the judiciary depends on the amount
of financial resources available. Therefore it seems reasonable to assume that p(x)
depends positively on income l(x).
For simplicity, we implement p(x) as a linear function of l(x). Since p(x) is a
probability it can only take values in [0, 1]. Consequently, we define it as
p(x) = (1− τ)l(x) = (1− x1 − x2)(1− x2) .
Note that ∂p∂x2 <
∂p
∂x1
< 0. An increasing share of corrupt as well as fair government
employees decreases p(x). The reason is that only private activities generate income
where government employees are financed over taxes and do not contribute to popula-
tion income.
The clean equilibrium exists for p(τ, 0) > 12−τ , i.e. for τ <
1
2(3 −
√
5) = 0.38. The
corrupt equilibrium exists for p(0, 1) < τ , which is always satisfied because p(0, 1) = 0.
The critical point (0, x̄2) is not an attractor for τ < 0.25, because condition (14) is then
violated; and it does not exist for other τ because (8) does not have a solution in [0, 1]
for τ > 0.25. So the hybrid equilibrium does not exist.
According to these results, the model predicts the following for a society in which the
detection probability of corrupt activity depends positively on income: If tax burden is
moderate, it either converges to the clean or the corrupt equilibrium, depending on the
initial strategy state. If taxes are very high, it converges to the corrupt equilibrium.
We display the solution trajectories in Figure 2, they are calculated with the tax
rates τ = {0.1; 0.15; 0.2; 0.3; 0.5; 0.8}.
As we see in Figure 2, the basin of attraction of the corrupt equilibrium broadens
with τ increasing. The reason is that a high τ reduces the incentive of private activity
because of a smaller relative payoff; firstly because more taxes have to be paid and
secondly because government wage is higher. This reduced incentive for private activity
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Figure 2: The dynamics of corruption with feedback effect.
is then responsible for a decrease in the population income, which itself increases the
payoff of a corrupt government employee. So under a higher tax rate, initial strategy
states with a lower share of corrupt government employees will converge towards the
corruption trap.
How can we interpret the shape of the basins of attraction? The corruption rate
equals x2x1+x2 in our model, which are straight lines from (0, 0) to points of the opposite
edge of the simplex. So for a given tax rate, a population with a lean government may
start off with a high corruption rate and still converge to the clean equilibrium. Con-
trarily, a population with a large government that starts off with the same corruption
rate may converge to the the corrupt equilibrium.
This example of a specific function p(x) suggests that understanding the quality of
institutions under different circumstances is crucial for the analysis of corruption: Only
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then are we able to say to which equilibrium a population converges from the current
strategy state. This knowledge then allows for reliable empirical consideration.
4 Conclusions
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to include feedback effects from population
variables such as corruption and growth rates to the individual decision to corrupt.
Most importantly we show that such an analysis requires the quality of institutions to
be an endogenous variable. We find that, for a general characterization of the feedback
effects, a population can converge to different equilibria which leads to path depen-
dence for the behavior of a population. Consequently, populations with distinct initial
strategy frequencies may converge to different equilibria in the long run. However, not
only may they follow different solution paths, but also may they feature different equi-
libria they can converge to. Depending on how the ability of institutions to cope with
corruption under different growth and corruption rates changes, the set of equilibria
actually changes.
These results have important implications for empirical research: Only if all coun-
tries in a sample converge to the same equilibrium, we expect findings with a high ex-
planatory power. If countries converge to different equilibria, a cross country analysis
is prone to underestimate the implications of corruption for those countries converging
to a corruption trap. Similarly, the consequences of corruption are overestimated for
those countries converging to a clean equilibrium.
In order to classify countries according to their convergence behavior, a deeper
understanding of how institutions and institutional quality depend on the dynamic
process they partly shape. We hope that our results stimulates economic research on
this topic.
We think that the framework of an evolutionary game has served for the purposes
well to make the point we intended to discuss. It has allowed us to look at aspects
like feedback effects that can only be analyzed in dynamic setups. However, in order
to keep dynamics tractable and still allow for individual decisions, the decision rules
we have to impose on the agents are bound to strong assumptions that apply to all
agents in the game. Further, the dynamics become too involved to allow for a more
sophisticated comprehension of the private sector.
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A Appendix: Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We accomplish this proof in two parts. First, we apply the local theory of nonlinear
systems and second, we use theorems of global theory of nonlinear systems to show
that we have found all attractors of (6).
A.1.1 Local Theory of Nonlinear Systems
From the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a solution in a frequency
dependent evolutionary game (Bruegger, 2005) and the differentiability (and therefore
Lipschitz-continuity) of the functions w(x) and c(x) we know that the differential equa-
tion system (6) has a unique solution. We redefine F : IR → IR as the right hand side
of system (6).
F (x) =
(
F1(x)
F2(x)
)
=
(
x1(1− x1 − x2) [(1− τ)(w(x)− 1)− x2(τ − c(x))]
x2(1− x1 − x2) [(1− τ)w(x) + (1− x2)(τ − c(x))]
)
.
In order to find the critical points of the system, we set F (x) = 0:
x1(1− x1 − x2) [(1− τ)(w(x)− 1)− x2(τ − c(x))] = 0
x2(1− x1 − x2) [(1− τ)w(x) + (1− x2)(τ − c(x))] = 0 .
There are nine possibilities which are solution candidates for this equation system.
1) x1 = 0 ∧ x2 = 0
2) x1 = 0 ∧ (1− x1 − x2) = 0
3) x1 = 0 ∧ (1− τ)w(x) + (1− x2)(τ − c(x)) = 0
4) (1− x1 − x2) = 0 ∧ x2 = 0
5) (1− x1 − x2) = 0 ∧ (1− x1 − x2) = 0
6) (1− x1 − x2) = 0 ∧ (1− τ)w(x) + (1− x2)(τ − c(x)) = 0
7) (1− τ)(w(x)− 1)− x2(τ − c(x)) = 0 ∧ x2 = 0
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8) (1− τ)(w(x)− 1)− x2(τ − c(x)) = 0 ∧ (1− x1 − x2) = 0
9) (1− τ)(w(x)− 1)− x2(τ − c(x)) = 0
∧ (1− τ)w(x) + (1− x2)(τ − c(x)) = 0 .
Conditions 1), 2), and 4) state that the vertices of the simplex are fixed points.
Condition 5) gives us the edge of the simplex where x3 = 0 as a set of critical points,
conditions 6) and 8) give two single points in this set as fixed points.
Condition 3) gives us a critical point on the edge of the simplex where x1 = 0. It only
exists if there is a solution x̄2 which satisfies
(1− τ)w(0, x̄2) + (1− x̄2)(τ − c(0, x̄2)) = 0 . (8)
By plugging
w(0, x̄2) =
τ
1− τ
(1− x̄2)2
x̄2
into (8), we receive
c(0, x̄2) =
τ
x̄2
. (9)
We substitute the expression for c(0, x̄2) given by (11) into the last equation and get
p(0, x̄2) =
τ
τ(1− x̄2)2 + x̄2 .
So the potential critical point (0, x̄2) only exists if p(0, x2) intersects with the function
g(x2) = ττ(1−x2)2+x2 at least once on ]0, 1[ for a given τ . The function g(x2) is strictly
increasing in the parameter τ and can take values that are greater than one. We
conclude that for high τ , an x̄2 will not exist. The function g(x2) is decreasing in x2
when its image is in the interval ]0, 1[.
Condition 7) implies
(1− τ)(w(x1, 0)− 1) = 0
w(x1, 0) = 1
τ
1− τ
1− x1
x1
= 1 ⇒ x1 = τ ,
so (τ, 0) is a fixed point.
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Finally, condition 9) supports a critical point if there is a solution to
(1− τ)(w(x1, x2)− 1)− x2(τ − c(x1, x2)) = 0
(1− τ)w(x1, x2) + (1− x2)(τ − c(x1, x2)) = 0 .
We rewrite the system as
(1− τ)w(x1, x2)− (1− τ)− x2(τ − c(x1, x2)) = 0
(1− τ)w(x1, x2) + (τ − c(x1, x2))− x2(τ − c(x1, x2)) = 0
and find c(x1, x2) = 1 by subtracting the two equations. Plugging this result into the
first of the equations of the system gives
(1− τ)(w(x1, x2)− 1)− x2(τ − 1) = 0
(w(x1, x2)− 1) + x2 = 0 → w(x1, x2) = 1− x2 .
We now use the explicit expression for w(x1, x2) and find
w(x1, x2) = 1− x2 → τ1− τ
(1− x1 − x2)(1− x2)
x1 + x2
= 1− x2
τ
1− τ (1− x1 − x2) = x1 + x2
τ = x1 + x2 .
Let us denote x̂2 as the solution of c(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = 1, and we derive further
c(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = 1
p(τ − x̂2, x̂2)((1− τ)(1− x̂2) + 1) = 1
p(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = 1(1− τ)(1− x̂2) + 1 .
So, only if we assume a p(x1, x2) such that p(τ−x̂2, x̂2) intersects with a function h(x2),
h(x2) =
1
(1− τ)(1− x2) + 1 ,
on [0, τ ], there exists a fixed point (τ − x̂2, x̂2). Note that h(x2) is increasing in τ and
increasing in x2. The image of the function h(x1) is in [12 , 1].
We enlist the critical points we have found in the first column of Table 1.
In a next step we want to analyze the stability of the critical points we have found
above.
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If a critical point x0 is hyperbolic,19 it is either a sink,20 a saddle,21 or a source22 (De-
finitions e.g.by Perko, 2000, p.102). It follows from the Hartman-Grobman Theorem23
that sinks of a differential equation system are asymptotically stable and sources and
saddles are unstable. So in order to determine if a hyperbolic critical point is asymp-
totically stable (and thus an EE) or not we only need to calculate the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian of F (x) evaluated at the critical point. Therefore, we first calculate the
elements of the Jacobian DF (x1, x2).
∂F1
∂x1
= (1− 2x1 − x2)
(
(1− τ)(w(x)− 1)− x2(τ − c(x))
)
+ x1(1− x1 − x2)
(
(1− τ)∂w(x)
∂x1
+ x2
∂c(x)
∂x1
)
∂F1
∂x2
= −x1
(
(1− τ)(w(x)− 1)− x2(τ − c(x))
)
+ x1(1− x1 − x2)
(
(1− τ)∂w(x)
∂x2
− (τ − c(x)) + x2 ∂c(x)
∂x2
)
∂F2
∂x1
= −x2
(
(1− τ)w(x) + (1− x2)(τ − c(x))
)
+ x2(1− x1 − x2)
(
(1− τ)∂w(x)
∂x1
− (1− x2)∂c(x)
∂x1
)
∂F2
∂x2
= (1− x1 − 2x2)
(
(1− τ)w(x) + (1− x2)(τ − c(x))
)
+ x2(1− x1 − x2)
(
(1− τ)∂w(x)
∂x2
− (τ − c(x))− (1− x2)∂c(x)
∂x2
)
.
For convenience we also restate
w(x) =
τ
1− τ
(1− x1 − x2)(1− x2)
x1 + x2
and (10)
c(x) = p(x)
(
(1− τ)w(x) + 1
)
with (11)
∂w
∂x1
= − τ
1− τ
(
1− x2
(x1 + x2)2
)
(12)
19None of the eigenvalues of DF (x0) has a zero real part.
20All eigenvalues of DF (x0) have negative real parts.
21At least one eigenvalue of DF (x0) has a positive and at least one has a negative real part.
22All eigenvalues of DF (x0) have positive real parts.
23The Hartman-Grobman Theorem states that if F is differentiable then there exists a homeomor-
phism that maps the trajectories in an open set around a hyperbolic critical point x0 onto trajectories
near x0 of the linear system ẋ = Ax with A = DF (x0). That is to say that near a hyperbolic critical
point x0 the nonlinear system ẋ = F (x) has the same qualitative structure as the linear system ẋ = Ax
with A = DF (x0).
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∂w
∂x2
=
τ
1− τ
(
1− 1 + x1
(x1 + x2)2
)
. (13)
We treat the critical points one by one in the order of Table 1.
Critical point (0,0): It is easy to see that ∂F1∂x2 (0, 0) = 0 and
∂F2
∂x1
(0, 0) = 0. The
eigenvalues of DF (0, 0) are thus ∂F1∂x1 (0, 0) and
∂F2
∂x2
(0, 0).24 We find
∂F1
∂x1
(0, 0) = (1− τ)w(0, 0)
∂F2
∂x2
(0, 0) = (1− τ)w(0, 0)(1− p(0, 0)) + τ − p(0, 0) .
The expression (1− τ)w(0, 0) is clearly positive, because of
lim
x1→0
x2→0
w(x1, x2) = ∞ .
If p(0, 0) such that ∂F2∂x2 (0, 0) 6= 0, then the critical point (0, 0) is hyperbolic and one
positive eigenvalue is enough to know that it is unstable (see e.g. Perko, 2000, Theorem
2, p. 130). If p(0, 0) such that ∂F2∂x2 (0, 0) = 0, then the second eigenvalue is equal to zero
and (0, 0) is not hyperbolic. It is then an unstable node, a saddle, or a saddle-node and
unstable therefore (see e.g. Perko, 2000, Theorem 1, p. 151).
Critical point (0,1): The critical point (0, 1) does always exist and is not hyperbolic.
In fact, we even have DF (0, 1) = 0, which indicates a very complex behavior of the
system near the critical point. For most other critical points it is more convenient to
analyze the behavior near them in IR2 (although we are only interested in the dynamics
on the simplex).25 For showing asymptotic stability of (0, 1) however, we will restrict
our analysis to the simplex, which makes our efforts more comprehensible in this case.
One method to show stability for critical points that are not hyperbolic is due to Lia-
punov. The theorem (see e.g. Perko, 2000, p. 131, Theorem 3) that states under which
conditions the existence of a Liapunov function (defined below) implies (asymptotic)
stability of a critical point only applies to critical points that are interior points of
the definition space of F (x). The critical point (0, 1) is a boundary point of the sim-
plex. Therefore we have to apply an extended theorem proved in Bruegger (2005)which
24The eigenvalues of a matrix
 
a b
c d
!
are equal to a and d if either b = 0 or c = 0 or both.
25One reason is that the Hartman-Grobman Theorem requires open subsets containing the hyperbolic
critical points. Most of our critical points are on the boundary of the simplex, however.
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states that the existence of a Liapunov function guarantees asymptotic stability for a
boundary point of the simplex if the simplex is invariant under ẋ = F (x).
Theorem 1 (Bruegger, 2005) Let E be an open subset of Σ and x0 ∈ E.26 Suppose
that F (x) ∈ C1(E) and F (x0) = 0, where the simplex is invariant under ẋ = F (x).
Suppose further that there exists a real valued function V ∈ C1(E) satisfying V (x0) = 0
and V (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ E \ x0. If V̇ (x) < 0 ∀x ∈ E, x0 is asymptotically stable.
We now have to show that there exists a Liapunov function for system (6) as defined
in Theorem 1. We will give evidence of existence by presenting an example: We show
in the following that function V (x),
V (x) = x21 + (1− x2)2 ,
is a Liapunov function. It is clear that V (x) > 0 ∀x ∈ IR2 \ (0, 1), hence V (x) > 0 ∀x ∈
Σ2. Further V (0, 1) = 0. Let us now look at V̇ (x).
V̇ (x) = 2x1ẋ1 + 2(1− x2)(−ẋ2)
= 2x21(1− x1 − x2)[(1− τ)(w(x)− 1)− x2(τ − c(x))]
− 2(1− x2)x2(1− x1 − x2)[(1− τ)w(x) + (1− x2)(τ − c(x))] .
We analyze V̇ (x) in E, the environment of (0, 1), which requires to evaluate w(x) and
c(x) in E.
lim
x2→1
w(x) = lim
x2→1
τ
1− τ
(1− x1 − x2)(1− x2)
x1 + x2
= 0
lim
x2→1
c(x) = lim
x2→1
p(x)
(
(1− τ)w(x) + 1
)
= p(0, 1) .
We conclude that for a sufficiently small environment of (0, 1) and for p(0, 1) < τ we
have
V̇ (x) = 2x21(1− x1 − x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[ (1− τ)(w(x)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−x2(τ − c(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
]
− 2(1− x2)x2(1− x1 − x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[ (1− τ)w(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+(1− x2)(τ − c(x))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
]
⇒ V (x) < 0 .
26Notation: E is the set of osculation points of E. Point x is an osculation point of E if E ∩Uρ(x) 6=
∅,∀ρ ∈ IR+. The set Uρ(x) is the ρ-neighborhood of x (or the open sphere around x). It is defined as
Uρ(x) = {y ∈ IRn; |x− y| < ρ}.
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So if p(0, 1) < τ , (0, 1) is asymptotically stable.
Critical point (0, x̄2): The critical point (0, x̄2) does not necessarily exist for all τ
and p(x1, x2). Because of ∂F1∂x2 (0, x̄2) = 0 the eigenvalues of the jacobian DF (0, x̄2) are
∂F1
∂x1
(0, x̄2) and ∂F2∂x2 (0, x̄2). By rearranging (8) to
(1− τ)w(0, x̄2)− x2(τ − c(0, x̄2)) = c(0, x̄2)− τ ,
we can write
∂F1
∂x1
(0, x̄2) = (1− x̄2)
(
(1− τ)w(0, x̄2)− x̄2(τ − c(0, x̄2))
)
= (1− x̄2)
(
c(0, x̄2)− τ
)
= τ
(1− x̄2)2
x̄2
> 0 ,
using (9) for the last equation. For the second eigenvalue we note that
(1− τ) ∂w
∂x̄2
(0, x̄2) = τ
x̄22 − 1
x̄22
and can then derive
∂F2
∂x2
(0, x̄2) = x̄2(1− x̄2) ·
[
(1− τ) ∂w
∂x2
(0, x̄2)− (τ − c(0, x̄2))− (1− x̄2) ∂c
∂x2
(0, x̄2)
]
= x̄2(1− x̄2) ·[
τ
(
x̄22 − 1
x̄22
− 1
)
+ c(0, x̄2)− (1− x̄2) ∂c
∂x2
(0, x̄2)
]
= x̄2(1− x̄2)
[
− τ
x̄22
+
τ
x̄2
− (1− x̄2) ∂c
∂x2
(0, x̄2)
]
= x̄2(1− x̄2)2
[
− τ
x̄22
− ∂c
∂x2
(0, x̄2)
]
.
We now have to determine the algebraic sign of the two eigenvalues. The second
eigenvalue is negative if
[
− τ
x̄22
− ∂c
∂x2
(0, x̄2)
]
< 0 .
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By replacing ∂c∂x2 (0, x̄2) by
∂p
∂x2
(0, x̄2) [(1− τ)w(0, x̄2) + 1] + p(0, x̄2)(1− τ) ∂w
∂x̄2
(0, x̄2)
=
∂p
∂x2
(0, x̄2)
[
τ
(1− x̄2)2
x̄2
+ 1
]
− p(0, x̄2)τ 1− x̄
2
2
x̄22
and rearranging terms we find the condition
p(0, x̄2)τ(1− x̄22)−
∂p
∂x2
(0, x̄2)
[
τ x̄2(1− x̄2)2 + x̄22
]
< τ (14)
for a negative second eigenvalue of DF (0, x̄2). We have assumed that p(x1, x2) is
decreasing in x2, however it is possible to find a p(x1, x2) that is consistent with (14).
We conclude that the critical point (0, x̄2) is then a saddle (and otherwise a source, since
the first eigenvalue is positive) which can attract solution trajectories in the simplex.
Condition (14) is satisfied, if p(0, x̄2) is not too high and p(0, x2) does not increase
strongly in x2.
Critical point (1,0): This critical point always exists but it is not hyperbolic. We
will show instability by analyzing the system (6) in the vicinity of (1, 0). This can be
done by looking at
−∂F1
∂x1
(1, 0) .
The intuition is as follows. Since (1, 0) is a fixed point, we have that ẋ1(1, 0) =
F1(1, 0) = 0. We now check which sign F1(x) takes if we marginally deviate from
(0, 1) by decreasing x1 marginally (and increasing x2 and x3 marginally). If −∂F1∂x1 (1, 0)
is negative (positive), we know that ẋ1 is negative (positive) in the vicinity of (1, 0)
since it is zero in (1, 0). We find
−∂F1
∂x1
(1, 0) = −(−1) [(1− τ)(w(1, 0)− 1)] = −(1− τ) .
So marginally deviating from (1, 0) by marginally decreasing x1 causes the function F1
to take a negative value. That means that a solution curve x(t) of system (6) starting
in the vicinity of (1, 0) will move away from (1, 0). So (1, 0) cannot be asymptotically
stable.
Critical point {(x1,1− x1) |x1 ∈ ]0,1[ }: This set of critical points always exists
and its elements are neither hyperbolic nor isolated critical points. In order to show
instability we can use the arguments made for the critical point (1, 0). We will check
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what signs F1(x1, x2) and F2(x1, x2) take in the vicinity of (x1, 1−x1). Deviating from
the edge of the simplex (x1, 1 − x1) means that we marginally decrease x1 and x2 at
the same time. So we are interested in the signs of
−∂F1
∂x1
(x1, 1− x1)− ∂F1
∂x2
(x1, 1− x1) and
−∂F2
∂x1
(x1, 1− x1)− ∂F2
∂x2
(x1, 1− x1) .
Note first that
w(x1, 1− x1) = 0 and c(x1, 1− x1) = p(x1, 1− x1) .
We use the expressions of we have given for the elements of the Jacobian DF (x) and
find
− ∂F1
∂x1
(x1, 1− x1)− ∂F1
∂x2
(x1, 1− x1)
= −
{
− x1
[
(1− τ)(w(x1, 1− x1)− 1)− (1− x1)(τ − c(x1, 1− x1))
]}
−
{
− x1
[
(1− τ)(w(x1, 1− x1)− 1)− (1− x1)(τ − c(x1, 1− x1))
]}
= 2x1
[
− (1− τ)− (1− x1)(τ − p(x1, 1− x1))
]
= −2x1
[
1− p(x1, 1− x1)− x1(τ − p(x1, 1− x1))
]
.
If τ > p(x1, 1−x1) then 1−p(x1, 1−x1) > τ −p(x1, 1−x1) > 0 and hence 1−p(x1, 1−
x1) − x1(τ − p(x1, 1 − x1)) > 0. If p(x1, 1 − x1) > τ then 0 > x1(τ − p(x1, 1 − x1))
and again 1 − p(x1, 1 − x1) − x1(τ − p(x1, 1 − x1)) > 0. If p(x1, 1 − x1) = τ then
1− p(x1, 1− x1)− x1(τ − p(x1, 1− x1)) = 0 again. So we can state
−∂F1
∂x1
(x1, 1− x1)− ∂F1
∂x2
(x1, 1− x1) < 0 .
That means that all solution curves starting in the vicinity of (x1, 1 − x1) will move
away from x1 = 1. Because this result holds for all x1 ∈ (0, 1) the critical points in
the set {(x1, 1 − x1) |x1 ∈ ]0, 1[ } cannot be stable; it is impossible that trajectories
starting in the vicinity of this edge of the simplex move towards a point in this set. It
is redundant to determine the sign of F2(x) in the vicinity of {(x1, 1−x1) |x1 ∈ ]0, 1[ }.
Critical point (τ,0): This critical point does always exist. It is easy to see that
∂F2
∂x1
(τ, 0) = 0 since x2 = 0. So we know that the two eigenvalues of DF (τ, 0) are
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∂F1
∂x1
(τ, 0) and ∂F2∂x2 (τ, 0). Note that
w(τ, 0) = 1 ,
∂w
∂x1
(τ, 0) = − 1
τ(1− τ) ,
c(τ, 0) = (2− τ)p(τ, 0) .
The eigenvalues of DF (τ, 0) are
∂F1
∂x1
(τ, 0) = −(1− τ)
∂F1
∂x1
(τ, 0) = (1− τ)[1− (2− τ)p(τ, 0)] .
We conclude that if 12−τ < p(τ, 0), the critical point is a sink. If p(τ, 0) <
1
2−τ , the
critical point is a saddle.
Critical point (τ − x̂2, x̂2): In order to analyze the stability of (τ−x̂2, x̂2), we evaluate
the elements of DF (τ − x̂2, x̂2). Note that
w(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = 1− x̂2
∂w
∂x1
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = − 1− x̂2
τ(1− τ)
∂w
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = −1− 1− x̂2
τ(1− τ) .
We find
∂F1
∂x1
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = (1− τ)(τ − x̂2)
(
− 1− x̂2
τ
+ x̂2
∂c
∂x1
(τ − x̂2, x̂2)
)
∂F1
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = (1− τ)(τ − x̂2)
(
− 1− x̂2
τ
+ x̂2
∂c
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2)
)
∂F2
∂x1
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = (1− τ)x̂2
(
− 1− x̂2
τ
− (1− x̂2) ∂c
∂x1
(τ − x̂2, x̂2)
)
∂F2
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = (1− τ)x̂2
(
− 1− x̂2
τ
− (1− x̂2) ∂c
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2)
)
.
Because we have assumed that ∂p∂x2 < 0 we have
∂c
∂x2
< 0, and therefore we know that
∂F1
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) < 0 .
Again from Assumption 1 we derive
∂F1
∂x1
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) > ∂F1
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2)
∂F2
∂x1
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) > ∂F2
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) .
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Let us abbreviate the elements of DF (τ − x̂2, x̂2) by ji, such that
DF (τ − x̂2, x̂2) =
(
j1 j2
j3 j4
)
.
The standard formula for eigenvalues of 2×2-matrices yields for DF (τ − x̂2, x̂2)
λ1 =
1
2
(
j1 + j4 +
√
j21 − 2j1j4 + j24 + 4j2j3
)
,
λ2 =
1
2
(
j1 + j4 −
√
j21 − 2j1j4 + j24 + 4j2j3
)
.
We are only interested in the real parts of the eigenvalues, for they determine the
stability of the critical point. A square root of a real discriminant ∆ always either has
a zero real part (if ∆ ≤ 0) or a positive real part (if ∆ > 0). Therefore we have that
λ1 ≥ λ2. If (τ − x̂2, x̂2) is stable if and only if λ1 < 0 ∧ λ2 < 0. So the necessary
condition for stability of (τ − x̂2, x̂2) is
λ1 < 0
1
2
(
j1 + j4 +
√
j21 − 2j1j4 + j24 + 4j2j3
)
< 0
j1 + j4 < −
√
j21 − 2j1j4 + j24 + 4j2j3
(j1 + j4)2 > j21 − 2j1j4 + j24 + 4j2j3
j1j4 > j2j3 .
We substitute the explicit elements of DF (τ−x̂2, x̂2) into the last equation. Simplifying
the expression leaves us with
1
τ
(1− τ)2(τ − x̂2)x̂2(1− x̂2)
(
∂c
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2)− ∂c
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2)
)
> 0
⇒ ∂c
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) > ∂c
∂x2
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) .
This is contradictory to Assumption 1. Thus, as long as we adhere to Assumption 1,
(τ − x̂2, x̂2) cannot be stable.
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Table 1: Critical points of the corruption game.
Critical point Conditions on τ and Asymptotic stability
(x1, x2) p(x1, x2) for existence
of critical point
(0, 0) none unstable
(0, 1) none asymptotically stable
if p(0, 1) < τ
(0, x̄2) x̄2 such that asymptotically stable
p(0, x̄2) = ττ(1−x̄2)2+x̄2 if τ < −x̄22
∂c
∂x2
(0, x̄2)
(1, 0) none unstable
(x1, 1− x1) none unstable
with x1 ∈ ]0, 1[
(τ, 0) none asymptotically stable
if 12−τ < p(τ, 0)
(τ̄ − x̂2, x̂2) x̂2 such that unstable
p(τ − x̂2, x̂2) = 1(1−τ)(1−x̂2)+1
A.1.2 Global Theory of Nonlinear Systems
It is left to show that no other attracting sets exist 27 and attractors 28 than those
found in the last subsection.
The Generalized Poincaré-Bendixson Theorem for Analytic Systems states that the ω-
limit set 29 of any trajectory of a two-dimensional, relatively-prime, analytic system is
either a critical point, a cycle, or a compound separatrix cycle. We show below that
the solution trajectories of system (6) cannot be closed. This allows us to exclude limit
cycles and compound separatrix cycles as ω-limits. We will then be able to conclude
that only evolutionary equilibria can be attractors.
27A closed invariant set A ∈ E is called an attracting set of a system ẋ = F (x) if there is some
neighborhood U of A such that for all x ∈ U , φt(x) ∈ U for all t ≥ 0 and φt(x) → A as t →∞.
28An attractor is an attracting set containing a dense orbit (a dense orbit is an orbit that comes
arbitrarily close to each point in the attractor).
29A point p ∈ E is an ω-limit point of the trajectory φ(t, x0) of the system ẋ = F (x) if there is a
sequence tn →∞ such that limn→∞ φ(tn, x) = p.
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In order to show that our system does not have any closed trajectories, we apply
index theory, a method that describes global behavior of the solutions to a differential
equation system (see e.g. Strogatz, 1994, Chapter 6). In Proof A.1 we have calculated
all critical points of system (6). They all are on the boundary of the simplex except
(τ − x̂2, x̂2), which is a saddle. We now assume that there exists a closed trajectory
to (6). Figure 3 shows all qualitatively different locations a closed trajectory could
occupy, they are indicated by the dotted curves T1, T2, and T3. The index at each of
the critical points is also shown in the figure (for an explanation of how to calculate
the index at critical points, see Strogatz, 1994, Chapter 6).
  x 2  
x 1  
±1 
+1 
-1 
T 1  
T 3  
T 2  
±1 
±1 
Figure 3: Locations of closed trajectories.
We can rule out closed trajectories as follows. Trajectories like T1 are impossible
because they cross the boundary of the simplex. The reason is the following. From
Bruegger (2005) we know that the simplex boundary is invariant under system (6).
So the boundary of the simplex contains straight-line trajectories. Since trajectories
cannot cross,30 we can exclude trajectories like T1. Trajectories like T2 can be excluded
as well because they do not enclose any fixed points at all. And trajectories like T3
violate the requirement that the indices inside the closed trajectories must sum up to
1 (see e.g. Strogatz, 1994, Theorem 6.8.2., p. 180). We conclude that system (6) does
not have any closed trajectories. Consequently, the ω-limit set of any trajectory of
our system is a critical point. It is clear from the definition of an attractor and the
concept of asymptotic stability, that only an asymptotically stable critical point can
30This follows directly from the Fundamental Existence-Uniqueness Theorem.
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be an attractor. We conclude that almost every trajectory through a point x ∈ Σ
approaches an EE in the limit. The sole exceptions are those trajectories that are the
separatrices of the system.
From the Poincaré-Bendixson Theorem we know that if a trajectory of a planar system
is confined to a closed, bounded region, then the trajectory is either attracted by a
critical point or a closed trajectory. Since the simplex is invariant under the dynamics
of system (6) and since we have shown that system (6) has no closed trajectories, we
can conclude, that there always exists an attractor in the corruption game. This results
holds for all p(x) and all τ .
